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Based on a universal understanding of the importance of fundamental human 
rights and the protection thereof, activists, academics and legal professionals 
alike have often pondered whether the European Union should accede to the 
European Convention of Human Rights. It is argued that accession would serve to 
ensure the protection and respect of these fundamental rights for and by all, yet 
numerous obstacles have halted the accomplishment of this ideal. 
This paper delves into these obstacles by primarily focusing on principles 
emerging from the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union, as well 
as the European Court of Human Rights. It then proceeds to discuss Opinion 
2/13 of the Court of Justice of the European Union and looks through the crystal 
ball to consider the consequences of this Opinion. It concludes by questioning 
whether accession under the terms posed by the Court of Justice of the European 
Union would indeed be beneficial for the protection of fundamental human rights 
in Europe. 
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ACCESSION OF THE EUROPEAN UNION TO THE ECHR 
Kirk Brincau and Rachel Vella Baldacchino 
Discussions relating to the role of fundamental human rights within the 
European Union (Hereinafter referred to as 'EU') are far from new. Although the 
founding treaties of the Union contained no specific provisions on the protection 
of fundamental rights, due to the prevailing focus, at the time, on the creation of a 
common market, in the decades following its inception a clear need to protect 
human rights within this steadily expanding new legal order emerged. This led 
the Court of Justice of the European Union (Hereinafter referred to as 'CJEU') to 
start developing a line of jurisprudence on human rights issues. The first 
reference to human rights related matters by the CJEU was made in 1969 in 
Stauder.676 Moreover, in order to strengthen the protection of fundamental
human rights within Europe in general and the EU specifically, the idea of the 
EU's accession to the European Convention on Human Rights (Hereinafter 
referred to as the 'ECHR') emerged in 1979 when the European Commission 
issued a Memorandum and officially recommended formal accession. 
A considerable amount of time and political prestige has been invested in the 
accession of the EU to the ECHR, by both the EU and the Council of Europe. This 
paper seeks to shed light on the status quo of the EU vis-a-vis its accession to the 
ECHR, particularly in the light of developments which have taken place in this 
regard since the question of accession was first brought to the table by the 
European Commission. 
1. The Origin of the Debate and the Apparent Lacunae in the Protection
of Fundamental Human Rights
An analysis of early judgments of the CJEU reveals that the Court refused to 
exercise judicial review over human rights standards as these could not, at the 
time, be inferred from Community Law. This is exemplified in Geitling vs. High 
Authority,677 wherein it was stated by the CJEU that: 'Community law, as it arises
under the ECSC Treaty, does not contain any general principle, express or 
otherwise, guaranteeing the maintenance of vested rights.'678 
The CJEU's approach changed in time with the increase of competences 
transferred by the Member States to the EU. An important milestone was 
676 Case 29-69 Erich Stauder vs. City of Ulm - Sozialamt [1969) ECR 1969 - 00419. 
677 Case 37 /59 Geitling Ruhrkohlen-Verkaufsgesel/schaft mbH vs. High Authority of the European 
Coal and Steel Community [1960) ECR 1960 - 00423. 
678 ibid 439. 
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reached in the Nold II judgment,679 where the Court held that: 'fundamental 
rights form an integral part of the general principles of law, the observance of 
which it ensures.'680 
In its determination of the scope of these fundamental rights, the Court referred 
to the domestic law of the Member States as well as to international treaties, and 
notably, explicitly referred to the ECHR.681 This showcased the CJEU's acceptance
of the ECHR and of the principles contained therein. In time, this formalised 
judicial acknowledgement of the ECHR's norms has prompted the drafters of the 
Treaty of the European Union (Hereinafter referred to as 'TEU') to expressly 
stipulate that fundamental rights, as guaranteed by the ECHR, constitute a part of 
EU law as general principles.682 This is in turn mirrored within the text of the
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (Hereinafter referred to as 
the 'Charter') which states that without prejudice to the possibility of more 
extensive protection, insofar as the Charter corresponds to the rights under the 
ECHR, the meaning and scope of those rights shall be the same.683
Notwithstanding the existent acknowledgements of human rights norms in 
various European laws and judicial pronouncements, the passage of time has 
brought to the fore lacunae in human rights protections within Europe. Given the 
fact that the EU is not a signatory to the ECHR, it cannot at present be held 
accountable for human rights violations under the ECHR. 
This problem is illustrated in Confederation Franfaise Democratique du 
Travail.684 The case was declared inadmissible ratione personae, as applications
brought against the Council of the European Communities fall outside the 
European Commission of Human Rights' competence. 
This gap in European human rights protection has led scholars to claim that EU 
acts enjoy some kind of 'immunity from the convention'.685 Indeed, EU
institutions are not subject to an external and independent review by the 
European Court of Human Rights (Hereinafter referred to as 'ECtHR') whilst 
Member States that are both members of the Council of Europe and of the EU 
679 Case 4/73 J. Nold v Commission of the European Communities [1974) ECR 1974 - 00471. 
680 ibid para. 13. 
681 ibid para. 12. 
602 Treaty on European Union (Maastricht Treaty) art 6 (3). 
683 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union [2000), OJ C 364/01, art 52 (3). 
684 Confederation Francaise Democratique du Travail vs. The European Communities (1978) App 
no 8030/77 [Commission Decision,10 July 1978). 
685 Ioanna Kosmidou, 'The Accession of the European Union to the European Convention on 
Human Rights: Accountability for Human Rights Violations before and after the Accession' 
(MA in Human Rights, Central European University 2012) 
<http://www.etd.ceu.hu/2013/kosmidou_ioanna.pdf> accessed 27 November 2016. 
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remain liable to the ECtHR to ensure that their human rights obligations, as 
signatories to the ECHR, are continuously met. 
The European Commission of Human Rights first attempted to address this issue 
in X vs. Germany,686 where the Commission conveyed the message that
obligations undertaken by a State under the ECHR cannot be undermined by 
other international agreements.687 It stated that even if a State is unable to 
perform its obligations due to other international agreements, it will 
nevertheless be answerable for any resulting breach under the ECHR.688
Moreover, in M & Co vs. the Federal Republic of Germany, 689 the European
Commission of Human Rights reiterated that, 
[A] transfer of powers does not necessarily exclude a State's
responsibility under the Convention with regard to the exercise of the
transferred powers. Otherwise the guarantees of the Convention could
wantonly be limited or excluded and thus be deprived of their
peremptory character690 
The European Commission of Human Rights also pointed out that the ECHR, as 
an instrument for the protection of the fundamental rights of individual human 
beings, requires an interpretation and application of its provisions that renders 
its safeguards both practical and effective. Most importantly, the Commission 
stated that the transfer of powers to an international organisation is not 
incompatible with the ECHR provided that within that organisation fundamental 
rights receive an equivalent protection.691 
The relationship between the judges of the CJEU and ECtHR is one of mutual 
respect, however, the EU's absence from the ECHR has inevitably led to certain 
inconsistencies in the case law of the two Courts. Instances of differing 
interpretations of human rights norms have been scarce, yet are nevertheless 
significant as they exemplify a different standard of protection. One illustration 
686 X vs. Germany (1958) App no 235/56 [Commission Decision, 10 June 1958). 
687 The European Commission of Human Rights was a special tribunal of the ECHR, whose 
mandate to determine whether individuals' cases were well-founded, and to pursue a case 
before the ECtHR on behalf of the individual if the case indeed is well-founded, continued in 
force until the coming into force of Protocol 11 of the ECHR in 1998 which allowed 
individuals to apply directly to the Court 
688 European Court of Human Rights, Press Unit, Factsheet - Case-law concerning the EU [July 
2015] <http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/FS_European_Union_ENG.pdf> accessed 30 
October 2015. 
689 M & Co vs. the Federal Republic of Germany (1990) App no 13258/87 [Commission Decision, 
9 February 1990]. 
690 ibid. 
691 ibid. 
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of such an occurrence can be seen in the judgments of Hoechst, 692 and 
Niemietz,693 which centred on the right to private and domestic life as protected
under Article 8 of the ECHR. Whilst the CJEU in Hoechst decided that this Article 
should be interpreted as excluding activities of a professional or business nature, 
the opposite approach was taken by the ECtHR in Niemietz. 
Furthermore, Matthews vs. United Kingdom illustrates an instance where the 
ECtHR found that EU law did not provide equivalent protection with the ECHR 
concerning the right to participate in the elections for the European 
Parliament.694 In this case the UK was condemned for something decided at 
European Community level. It is important to note that since the violation had its 
source in primary EU law, the UK alone could not in principle decide to comply 
with the judgment of the ECtHR.695 For this reason, this case brings to the fore 
the potential problems arising from the absence of direct accountability of EU 
institutions to the ECtHR. 
The doctrine of equivalent protection was further elaborated in Bosphorus vs. 
Jreland.696 In Bosphorus, the ECtHR held that the protection given by the EU is 
equivalent to that of the ECHR and specified that 'equivalent' should be 
interpreted as meaning 'comparable', not 'identicaf'.697 The position taken by the 
Court means that a Member State can in principle presume that it is not 
breaching the ECHR by fulfilling its international obligations, provided the 
international organisation itself ensured adequate protection of human rights.698 
In exceptional cases, where the protection is manifestly deficient, this 
presumption can be rebutted.699 
This doctrine was created in the framework of international co-operation 
between the two Courts and represents the most important contribution of the 
ECtHR towards the maintenance of legal certainty and harmony with CJEU 
jurisprudence by taking a default position that the EU's protection of human 
692 Joined cases 46/87 and 227 /88 Hoechst AG vs. Commission of the European Communities 
[1989]. 
693 Niemietz vs. Germany (1992) App no. 13710/88 (ECHR, 16 December 1992). 
694 Matthews vs. United Kingdom (1999) App no. 24833/94 (ECHR, 18 February 1999). 
69s Olivier De Schutter, 'Accession of the European Union to the European Convention on 
Human Rights' (2007) <http://www.statewatch.org/news/2007 /sep/decchutte-
contributin-eu-echr.pdf> accessed 23 October 2015. 
696 Bosphorus Hava Yollari Turizm Ve Ticaret Anonim Sirketi vs. Ireland (2005) App no. 
45036/98 (ECHR, 30 June 2005). 
697 ibid para. 155. 
698 Martin Kuijer, 'The Accession of the European Union to the ECHR: A Gift for the ECHR's 60th 
Anniversary or an Unwelcome Intruder at the Party?' [2011] 3 Amsterdam Law Forum 17, 
17-32. 
699 Bosphorus Hava Yollari Turizm Ve Ticaret Anonim Sirketi v Ireland (2005) App no. 45036/98 
(ECHR, 30 June 2005) para. 156. 
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rights is equivalent to that of the ECHR.700 It must be noted that the doctrine of 
equivalent protection as it stands today serves to avoid holding a state 
accountable for following a rule created by an International organisation, even 
without the consent of the specific state and also to avoid reviewing EU law. 
Accordingly, the doctrine is not to be applied in cases where the Member State 
has a large margin of discretion regarding the implementation of EU law. 
The doctrine can be criticized as shielding EU law from ECtHR scrutiny. Indeed, 
this presumption of equivalence, that is rebuttable only by a manifestly deficient 
protection of rights, only considers an abstract review of the circumstances of 
the case. As a group of concurring judges pointed out in Bosphorus,701 this was 
'in marked contrast to the supervision generally carried out by the ECHR'.7oz
Moreover, it is important to note that through this doctrine the ECtHR does not 
take into consideration the fact that the access of individuals to the CJEU is 
limited. Individuals are characterised as non-privileged applicants by the CJEU 
and must thereby satisfy strict criteria in order to challenge EU measures. 
Additionally, CJEU decisions are not scrutinised by any other independent body 
thus adding to the feeling that the EU is immune. In accordance with the 
Plaumann test (which has been criticized as overly restrictive and challenged 
without success), in order for an individual to be able to have locus standi in front 
of the CJEU he must have a direct and individual concern. This means that 
applicants must be affected by the measure by: 'reason of certain attributes 
which are peculiar to them or by reason of circumstances in which they are 
differentiated from all other persons and by virtue of these factors distinguishes 
them individually just as in the case of the person addressed.'703 
This makes it very difficult for individuals who wish to challenge EU measures of 
general application to be awarded locus standi. In fact, Craig and De Burca state 
that the Plaumann test has made it impossible for an applicant to succeed in 
obtaining standing before the CJEU, except in very limited cases.704 
7oo Viktoria Tsvetanova, 'The EU's Accession to the ECHR: The Courts' Relationship Prior to 
Accession' (2014) <http:/ /www.gulawreview.org/ entries/ eu/the-eu%E2%80%99s­
accession-to-the-echr-the-courts%E2%80%99-relationship-prior-to-accession> accessed 
23 October 2015. 
701 Joint Concurring Opinion of Judges Rozakis, Tulkens, Traja, Botoucharova, Zagrebelsky and 
Garlicki. 
702 Bosphorus Hava Yollari Turizm Ve Ticaret Anonim Sirketi vs. Ireland (2005) App no. 
45036/98 (ECHR, 30 June 2005)., Joint Concurring Opinion of Judges Rozakis, Tulkens, 
Traja, Botoucharova, Zagrebelsky and Garlicki, para 4. 
703 Case 25-62 Plaumann & Co. vs. Commission of the European Economic Community [1963) ECR 
1963 - 00253. 
704 Paul Craig and Grainne de Burca, EU Law: Text, Cases, and Materials (5th edn, OUP 2011) 
494-496. 
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These lacunae are evident and it is for this reason that the discussion on the EU's 
accession to the ECHR is not a new one - it was first proposed over thirty-five 
years ago by the European Commission in 1979.705 Many obstacles have 
nonetheless stood in the way of accession. One such obstacle was Opinion 2/94. 
On the 30 November 1994, the Council decided to seek the advice of the CJEU 
regarding the issue of accession. However, in Opinion 2/94 the CJEU observed 
that accession was impossible in the light of Community law as it existed at the 
time, since there was no firm legal basis for it: 'as Community law now stands, 
the Community has no competence to accede to the Convention.' 706
The matter resurfaced in 2002 when President of the Court M. Gil Carlos 
Rodriguez Iglesias declared himself to be personally in favour of accession and 
observed that accession would: 'reinforce the uniformity of the system for the 
protection of fundamental rights in Europe.'707 
This can be seen to have led to the obligation of the EU to accede to the ECHR as 
drafted in the Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on European Union and the 
Treaty establishing the European Community. 
2. A New Era for the EU after the Treaty of Lisbon
There can be no doubt that today, close to six years after the coming into force of 
Europe's new treaty framework, the Treaty of Lisbon has fundamentally 
amended the character of the EU, albeit not without having first trudged through 
lengthy political hurdles until reaching its final form. Among the significant 
changes brought about by the Treaty of Lisbon, a string of new provisions that on 
the face of it enhance human rights protection in the EU can be traced. Accession 
to the ECtHR has been rendered more feasible than ever. 
The term 'Community' was replaced by 'Union' throughout the treaty texts, and 
the treaty now makes the EU one single legal entity at international law. In 
addition, the Treaty of Lisbon notably incorporated the Charter as EU primary 
law, thereby resolving an issue that had been left unanswered since the Charter 
was first drafted and published in the Official Journal of the European 
Communities in 2000.708 The politico-legal consequences of the Lisbon
7os Bulletin of the European Communities, Supplement 2/79, Memorandum on the accession of 
the European Communities to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms, COM (79) 210 final, 2 May 1979. 
106 Court of Justice, Opinion 2/94 (28 March 1996), para 39. 
101 Address given by Gil Carlos Rodriguez Iglesias (31 January 2002) 
<http:/ /www.cvce.eu/ content/publication/2003 /9 /23 / c201 f6b4-2 lc4-408b-9a 72-
3b083048d5ec/publishable_en.pdf> accessed 30 October 2015. 
7os Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union [2000] OJ C 364/01. 
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developments in relation to human rights throughout the EU polity are several, 
and shall be analysed with due care in this article. 
Article 6 of the TEU has a tripartite structure. Firstly, the text recognises the 
principles contained within the Charter and gives it binding force, which had 
since its proclamation in 2000 been overshadowed by an 'apparent lack of 
importance'.709 The Treaty of Lisbon does not itself incorporate the Charter, 
however, it accords the Charter with a legal standing that is on par with that of 
the treaties. In a separate Declaration annexed to the Treaty of Lisbon,710
Member States have additionally reiterated that the Charter does not broaden 
the scope of EU law beyond the powers already conferred to the EU, nor does it 
establish any new task or prerogative other than those in the Treaties. The 
deliberate decision to exclude the Charter from being a part of the Treaty fabric 
itself, however, demonstrated a conscious reluctance to endow the Charter with 
a constitutional status, 711 regardless of the fact that it has been accorded the 
same legal value as the treaties, and hence any political adviser or legal 
draftsman would necessarily be bound to bear due attention to the Charter text 
in the EU law-making process or in considering the legality of national law that 
implements EU law.712
In the post-Lisbon years, it has become notable that the CJEU increasingly 
chooses to refer to the Charter in pronounced judgements, to the detriment of 
mention of human rights protection as arising in the context of the ECHR.713 This 
observation is itself supported by an analysis of all cases decided by the CJEU 
since the Charter became binding until the end of 2012 carried out by Grainne de 
Burca,714 in which she presented figures demonstrating that in the 122 cases in 
which the Charter was referred to, only 18 of these cross-referred to the ECHR. 
109 Sionaidh Douglas-Scott, 'The European Union and Human Rights after the Treaty of Lisbon' 
[2011] 11 HRLR 650. 
710 Declarations annexed to the Final Act of the Intergovernmental Conference which adopted the 
Treaty of Lisbon, Declaration concerning the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European 
Union, (13 December 2007). 
711 Sionaidh Douglas-Scott, 'The Relationship Between the EU and the ECHR Five Years on from 
the Treaty of Lisbon' [2015] Bernitz, de Vries, Weatherill eds, Five Years Legally Binding 
Charter of Fundamental Rights 
<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2533207> accessed 30 October 
2015. 
m Paul Craig, The Lisbon Treaty: Law Politics, and Treaty Reform (OUP 2010) 200. 
713 Sionaidh Douglas-Scott, 'The Relationship Between the EU and the ECHR Five Years on from 
the Treaty of Lisbon' [2015] Bernitz, de Vries, Weatherill eds, Five Years Legally Binding 
Charter of Fundamental Rights 
<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2533207> accessed 30 October 
2015. 
714 Grainne De Burca, 'After the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights: the Court of Justice as a 
human rights adjudicator?' [2013] Maastricht JI European and Comparative Law, 168 
<http://www.maastrichtjournal.eu/pdf_file/lTS/MJ_20_02_0l68.pdf> accessed 30 October 
2015. 
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The implications of this is a pattern of divergence and autonomy between the EU 
human rights protection regime as opposed to the protection regimes derived 
from other human rights instruments, not least the ECHR. This is a reflection that 
confirms the findings of the CJEU in the Kadi ruling, wherein it was held that, 
the review by the Court of the validity of any Community measure in the 
light of fundamental rights must be considered to be the expression, in a 
community based on the rule of law, of a constitutional guarantee 
stemming from the EC Treaty as an autonomous legal system which is not 
to be prejudiced by an international agreement 715 
Further observation may be drawn with respect to the fact that the EU's role 
over human rights remains somewhat ambivalent, in that the EU's competence 
over human rights is at present solely limited to oversight of actions undertaken 
by EU institutions, and to Member States in certain circumstances. 716 Arguably,
ensuring EU competence in the field of human rights protection is acquiring 
more pressing importance than ever before. The EU's competence 'creeps' 
further with every treaty extension, from its inception under the European Coal 
and Steel Community having competence to facilitate inter-state trade in coal 
and steel, to the EU as we know it today having undergone a functional spill-over 
allowing it to legislate not only in relation to trade and the internal market, but 
also in various matters ranging from environmental and fisheries policies, to 
data protection and citizen privacy, to toy safety and consumer rights standards. 
Accession of the EU to the ECHR is envisaged in the Treaty of Lisbon where the 
chosen wording foresees an EU that has become a fully-fledged member of the 
ECHR in the very manner in which the treaty-drafters selectively utilised the 
imperative 'the Union shall accede'. The chosen wording in the second part of the 
Treaty of Lisbon's Article 6 thus evidently goes beyond providing a mere legal 
basis for accession, but inherently implies that a failure to proceed with 
accession would constitute a breach of the treaty. 
3. Measures Taken to Enable the EU to Accede to the ECHR
The Fourteenth Protocol to the ECHR, which entered into force on 1 June 2010, 
just over six years after it was opened for ratification by Member States, arriving 
715 Case C-402/05 Yassin Abdullah Kadi et. vs. Council of the European Union [2008] ECR 1-
06351, paras. 298-299. 
716 Sionaidh Douglas-Scott, 'The Relationship Between the EU and the ECHR Five Years on from 
the Treaty of Lisbon' [2015] Bernitz, de Vries, Weatherill eds, Five Years Legally Binding 
Charter of Fundamental Rights 
<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2533207> accessed 30 October 
2015. 
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at the culmination of a lengthy process of deliberation aimed at reforming the 
Convention system by preserving its long-term effectiveness through 
mechanisms that will seek to alleviate the current backlog of applications to the 
Court, and to pre-empt the foreseen increased caseload should the EU eventually 
accede to the ECHR. Most crucially, it paved the way for EU accession to the 
ECHR, by amending Article 59 to state that, 'The European Union may accede to 
this Convention'.717 
The process of accession of the EU, according to the text of the Treaty of Lisbon, 
entails the carrying out of a highly technical and complex procedure, under 
Article 218 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (Hereinafter 
referred to as the 'TFEU'), that governs all EU agreements with third countries 
and international agreements. In order for the EU to conclude such an 
agreement, this Article mandates the unanimity of the Council of Ministers, the 
consent of the European Parliament through a qualified majority vote of two 
thirds, and the subsequent ratification in all EU and Council of Europe Member 
States. In the light of this contextual background, in April 2013 a draft and 
revised accession agreement (Hereinafter referred to as the 'DAA') was signed on 
behalf of the Council of Europe and the European Commission. 718 This agreement
was reached despite initial reservations from some Member States on the 
particular terms of the EU's participation within the ECHR and has been 
described as an 'achievement',719 
Possibly the most significant innovation in the DAA is the introduction of the co­
respondent mechanism. The intended purpose of this mechanism is to aid in the 
determination of which particular Member State or other body is to be held 
responsible in the ECtHR for a human rights violation in the context of EU law. 
Thus, allowing for the joint participation of the EU and of the EU Member State or 
States concerned in the alleged breach. Inclusion of such a provision is a logical 
solution where the majority of EU legislation is implemented by the Member 
States themselves, yet simultaneously Member States may or may not, in specific 
circumstances, be able to exercise discretion as to how a law is to be 
717 The Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Protocol 
No. 14, art 17. 
718 Fifth Negotiation Meeting Between the CDDH ad hoc negotiation group and the European 
Commission on the accession of the European Union to the European Convention on Human 
Rights, 'Draft revised agreement on the accession of the European Union to the Convention 
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms' (10 June 2013), 
<http:/ /www.coe.int/t/ dghl/standardsetting/hrpolicy / Accession/Meeting_reports/ 4 7 _1 (2 
013)008rev2_EN.pdf> accessed 30 October 2015. 
719 Sionaidh Douglas-Scott, 'The Relationship Between the EU and the ECHR Five Years on from 
the Treaty of Lisbon' [2015] Bernitz, de Vries, Weatherill eds, Five Years Legally Binding 
Charter of Fundamental Rights 
<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2533207> accessed 30 October 
2015. 
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implemented and the problematic rule may originate from the EU measure. On 
the other hand, a possible breach may arise from the Treaties themselves, which 
owing to their very nature as primary law of the EU cannot be easily amended 
following a finding of a human rights breach without the unanimous consent of 
the Member States. The determination of the appropriate respondent has proved 
to be a controversial point,72° and a key question to be answered after having 
been raised in Article l(b) of Protocol No. 8 to the Treaty of Lisbon which 
requires the accession agreement to make provision: 'in particular with regard 
to: ( ... ] the mechanisms necessary to ensure that proceedings by non-Member 
States and individual applications are correctly addressed to Member States 
and/or the Union as appropriate." 
The provisions within the DAA that set out to deal with this concern do so by 
stipulating that a 1-ligh Contracting Party shall become a co-respondent only at 
its own request and by decision of the Court',721 and where an application is
directed against one or more Member States of the Union, the EU may itself 
become a co-respondent where the allegation calls into question the 
compatibility of a provision of EU law with the ECHR. In the case of allegations 
relating to the Treaties or of any other provision having the same legal value as 
the Treaty instruments, the DAA further provides that the EU Member States 
may all become co-respondents. 722 As amendments cannot be carried out to the 
Treaties by the EU institutions acting alone, Member State involvement is 
required ad necessitatem.
Under EU law, the CJEU has historically only had very limited jurisdiction to 
review Common Foreign and Security Policy (Hereinafter referred to as 'CFSP') 
acts, and even after the enactment of the Treaty of Lisbon, the competence of the 
EU itself to legislate in this field remains limited and subject to special rules and 
specific procedures.723 Judicial actions undertaken pursuant to Article 275 TFEU 
do not apply with respect to CFSP. This is subject to two exceptions in relation to 
the delimitation of EU competences and the CFSP, and where actions for 
annulment are brought against decisions providing for restrictive measures 
against natural or legal persons adopted by the Council in connection with, for 
instance, terroristic acts. However, while the CJEU has declared that certain acts 
adopted in the context of the CFSP fall outside the ambit of judicial review 
120 Sionaidh Douglas-Scott, 'The European Union and Human Rights after the Treaty of Lisbon' 
(2011) 11 HRLR 664. 
121 Fifth Negotiation Meeting Between the CDDH ad hoc negotiation group and the European 
Commission on the accession of the European Union to the European Convention on Human 
Rights, 'Draft revised agreement on the accession of the European Union to the Convention 
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms' (10 June 2013), art 3(2). 
122 ibid art 3(3). 
123 Brid Moriarty and Eva Massa, Human Rights Law (4th edn, OUP 2012) 173. 
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allowed to the Court under EU law, it has never clearly defined the extent to 
which its jurisdiction is limited in CFSP matters. 724 
Human rights breaches unfortunately occur in foreign policy operations, ranging 
from violations of the right to life, to arbitrary detention, and to human 
trafficking by foreign forces. It is generally recognised that CFSP acts themselves 
are not immune to possibly breaching human rights protection enshrined within 
the ECHR, and it is for this reason that the DAA includes rules to allow for the 
review of: 'acts, measures, or omissions, regardless of the context in which they 
occur, and including with regard to matters relating to the EU CFSP'.725 
Other points of contention requiring some measure of attention which were 
dealt with within the DAA include draft rules on the appointment of the EU judge 
to the ECtHR, which judge is upon appointment to have equal status to that of the 
other judges, and whose election is also to involve the European Parliament. 726 
According to this same Article, the EU shall be 'entitled to participate in the 
Committee of Ministers'. The DAA also establishes that the EU is to contribute to 
expenditure undertaken by the Council of Europe towards the proper 
functioning of the ECtHR. Fundamentally, throughout the entire text of the DAA 
and the negotiations that surround it, a demonstrable intrinsic complexity 
arising from the simple fact that the ECHR was not originally intended to cater 
for the accession of a large supranational entity, and as a result of which 
providing for EU accession shall continue to be fraught with stumbling blocks for 
years to come, not least after the publication of Opinion 2/13, and until which 
time the EU shall continue to lack a source of external human rights 
accountability. 
4. Court of Justice: Opinion 2/13
The CJEU was tasked by the European Commission to give its opinion on the 
compatibility of the DAA with EU Law, in accordance with Article 218(11) of the 
TFEU, which it carried out through its Opinion 2/13, delivered on the 18 
December 2014. Unexpectedly, it was held by the judges in Luxembourg that the 
724 The CJEU has the opportunity to properly define the contours of its jurisdiction in CFSP 
matters in the cases of Rosneft Oil Company 0/SC vs. Her Majesty's Treasury (Case C 72/15) 
and H vs. Council of the European Union, European Commission (Case C 455/14 P) 
725 Fifth Negotiation Meeting Between the CDDH ad hoc negotiation group and the European 
Commission on the accession of the European Union to the European Convention on Human 
Rights, 'Draft explanatory report to the Agreement on the Accession of the European Union 
to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms', (10 June 
2013), para 23 
<http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/standardsetting/hrpolicy / Accession/Meeting_reports/ 4 7 _1(2 
013)008rev2_EN.pdf> accessed 30 October 2015. 
726 ibid art 7. 
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DAA as presented was not compatible with the EU treaties and that it 
undermined the autonomy of EU law. Although several experts had voiced 
concerns over certain aspects of the DAA, an opinion as critical and 
uncompromising as Opinon 2/13 was hardly expected. 
The CJEU took a strong and decisive stance on the matter, going against the 
opinions of major EU institutions as well as EU Member States. The Judges in 
Luxembourg were heavily criticised for their unyielding stance. The arguments 
of the CJEU where divided under the following headings, 
a) The specific characteristics and the autonomy of EU law;
b) Article 344 TFEU;
c) The co-respondent mechanism;
d) The procedure for the prior involvement of the Court of Justice; and
e) The specific characteristics of EU law as regards judicial review in CFSP
matters.
These will each be considered in turn, however, it is apparent that the key theme 
in Opinion 2/13 is the autonomy of EU law. 
5. The Specific Characteristics and the Autonomy of EU Law
First, the CJEU was concerned that Article 53 ECHR might compromise EU law. 
This Article allows Contracting Parties to lay down higher standards of 
protection of fundamental rights than those guaranteed by the ECHR. Although 
Article 53 of the Charter appears to state something very similar to Article 53 
ECHR, its scope was curtailed by the CJEU in the 2013 Melloni judgement where 
the Court held that Member States could not adopt higher standards than the 
Charter in cases where the EU has fully harmonized the relevant law. n7 
The CJEU opined that Article 53 ECHR should be coordinated with Article 53 of 
the Charter, as interpreted by the CJEU.728 This means that where the rights 
recognised by the Charter correspond to those guaranteed by the ECHR, the 
power granted to Member States to exceed the level of protection in the ECHR 
must be limited to that which is necessary to ensure that the level of protection 
provided for by the Charter and the primacy, unity and effectiveness of EU Jaw 
are not compromised. The CJEU is seeking to prevent the scenario where the EU 
727 Joakim Nergelius, 'The accession of the EU to the European Convention on Human Rights' 
[2015] SIEPS <http://www.sieps.se/sites/defau1t/files/Sieps%202015_3%20web.pdf> 
accessed 20 September 2015. 
na Court of Justice, Opinion 2/13, para 189. 
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Member States use Article 53 ECHR to adopt higher standards in areas covered 
by harmonised EU law.729 
Secondly, the CJEU was concerned that the principle of mutual trust under EU 
law established earlier in Melloni could be undermined.73° According to this 
principle, a Member State may only check whether another Member State has 
observed fundamental rights guaranteed by the EU in 'exceptional 
circumstances'.731 The principle of mutual trust therefore consists in an 
assumption that fundamental rights are being respected in other Member States. 
The reasoning laid down in Melloni has elicited controversy, and indeed some 
authors are of the opinion that fundamental rights standards in the EU were 
lowered due to this principle. Nevertheless, the CJEU continues to stress in 
Opinion 2/13 that it considers this principle to be of fundamental importance for 
EU Law.132 Moreover, a recent judgment concerning the European Arrest 
Warrant has prompted the CJEU to revaluate and restate the importance of 
mutual trust between Member States for the creation and maintenance of an area 
without frontiers. While referring to the case law of the ECtHR, the CJEU stated 
that when evidence of a real risk of inhuman and degrading treatment exists, that 
risk must first be ascertained and it is necessary to demonstrate that there are 
substantial grounds for believing that the individual concerned will in fact be 
exposed to inhuman or degrading treatment because of detention conditions. 733 
The CJEU has clearly attached great importance to the notion of mutual trust, as 
it is one of the common values on which the EU is founded. The DAA was 
considered by the CJEU to endanger this principle due to Member States being 
required to check that another Member State is observing its fundamental rights 
obligations. This according to the CJEU would upset the underlying balance of the 
EU and undermine the autonomy of EU law. According to the Court the key flaw 
lies in the fact that the EU's intrinsic nature is being disregarded in order for it to 
be given a role identical to that of other contracting parties. In the Court's 
opinion, the DAA fails to take into consideration the fact that the Member States 
have, by reason of their membership to the EU, accepted that relations between 
them as regards the matters covered by the transfer of powers from the Member 
States to the EU are governed by EU law to the exclusion, if EU law so requires, of 
729 Jed Odermatt, 'A Giant Step Backwards? Opinion 2/13 on the EU's Accession to the European 
Convention on Human Rights' (2015) Leuven Centre for Global Governance Studies 
<https://ghum.kuleuven.be/ggs/wp150-odermatt.pdf> accessed 20 September 2015. 
73
° Court of Justice, Opinion 2/13, paras 191-195. 
731 Jed Odermatt, 'A Giant Step Backwards? Opinion 2/13 on the EU's Accession to the European 
Convention on Human Rights' (2015) Leuven Centre for Global Governance Studies 
<https://ghum.kuleuven.be/ggs/wp150-odermatt.pdf> accessed 20 September 2015. 
732 Court of Justice, Opinion 2/13, para 191. 
733 Joined Cases C-404/15 and C-659/15, Pal Aranyosi and Robert Ciildiiraru vs. 
Generalstaatsanwaltschaft Bremen [2016] (Grand Chamber, 5 April 2016) para 78. 
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any other law.734
The Court further noted that Protocol No. 16 to the ECHR permits the Highest 
Courts and Tribunals of the Member States of the EU to seek advisory opinions 
from the ECtHR on questions of interpretation or application of the rights and 
freedoms guaranteed by the ECHR and its Protocols.735 The mechanism 
established by the Protocol was seen as a threat to the autonomy of EU Law as a 
preliminary reference might be made to the ECtHR rather than the CJEU.736
Interestingly, Protocol 16 has not entered into force and the EU is not a party to 
it. In its Opinion, the CJEU cautiously opted for an ex ante attack, fearing the 
circumvention of the preliminary ruling procedure under Article 267 TFEU. The 
Court's concerns indicate a level of misunderstanding by the Court, since Article 
3(6) DAA shows that the prior involvement mechanism is only possible where 
there is a co-respondent.737 
6. Article 344 TFEU
Article 344 TFEU safeguards the CJEU's monopoly of dispute settlement as it 
prohibits EU Member States from submitting any dispute concerning the 
interpretation of EU law to any method of dispute settlement other than those 
provided in the EU Treaties. 
There is a clear tension between Article 344 TFEU and Article 55 ECHR. The 
former calls upon Member States to bring disputes concerning EU law before the 
CJEU, whereas Article 55 ECHR demands a settlement of disputes relating to the 
ECHR before the ECtHR by means of the ECHR's inter-State procedure under 
Article 33.738 According to the CJEU's interpretation, Article 33 ECHR could also 
be applied to disputes between the Member States, or between those Member 
States and the EU, even though it is EU law that is in issue.739
Article 5 of the DAA reduces the scope of the obligation laid down in Article 55 of 
the ECHR but still allows for the possibility that the EU or Member States might 
submit an application to the ECtHR under Article 33 ECHR, concerning an alleged 
734 ibid para 193. 
735 ibid para 196. 
736 ibid paras 198-199. 
737 Tobias Lock, 'The future of the European Union's accession to the European Convention on 
Human Rights after Opinion 2/13: is it still possible and is it still desirable?', (2015) 
European Constitutional Law Review 239-273. 
73a Adam tazowski and Ramses A. Wessel, 'When Caveats Turn into Locks: Opinion 2/13 on 
Accession of the European Union to the ECHR' (2015) No.1 German Law Journal 
<https://www.utwente.nl/bms/pa/research/wesseJ/wessel108.pdf> accessed 20 
September 2015. 
739 Court of Justice, Opinion 2/13, para 205. 
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violation thereof by a Member State or the EU, respectively, in conjunction with 
EU law.740 However, it must be noted that the procedure under Article 33 is not 
mandatory and that the EU and its Member States may continue to bring before 
the CJEU any disputes arising out of interpretation and application of the ECHR. 
Nevertheless, this was not enough according to the CJEU, which considered it a 
threat to the CJEU's exclusive jurisdiction and it was thus considered to be in 
violation of Article 344 TFEU. 741 
The CJEU demands the inadmissibility of all State complaints in front of the 
ECtHR as far as the relevant provisions of the ECHR also fall within the scope of 
EU law and on the applicant and the respondent side there are Member States of 
the EU or the EU itself. However, this demand does not seem to consider the 
agreements already concluded by the EU which do not contain exception 
provisions as noted by the Advocate General.742 
Advocate General Kokott traced a problem in regards to Article 344 TFEU, yet 
stated that it would be sufficient to start infringement proceedings in accordance 
with Articles 258 to 260 TFEU against EU Member States if they settle their 
disputes before other international instances. 743 Moreover, the same Advocate
General envisaged that if a higher degree of protection was required to ensure 
the effectiveness of Article 344 TFEU, then EU Member States could be required, 
prior to accession, to declare with binding force under international law, that 
they will not engage in proceedings under Article 33 ECHR where the object of 
dispute falls within the material scope of EU law.744 This would ensure that 
Member States would be bound and liable to respect the exclusive jurisdiction of 
the CJEU. 
6.1 The Co-Respondent Mechanism 
The Court found fault in two aspects of the co-respondent mechanism: the 
procedure for involvement and the allocation of responsibility. 
Firstly, in regards to the procedure for involvement, if the EU or Member States 
request leave to intervene as co-respondents in a case before the ECtHR, they 
must prove that certain conditions are met, with the ECtHR deciding on that 
request in the light of the reasons given. In order to review this matter, the 
ECtHR would necessarily be required to assess rules of EU law, falling within the 
740 ibid para 207. 
741 ibid paras 212-214. 
742 Court of Justice, Opinion 2/13, View of Advocate General Kokott, para 117. 
743 ibid para 118. 
744 Ibid para 120. 
162 
ELSA MALTA LAW REVIEW 
exclusive domain of the CJEU.745 Furthermore, the ECtHR could adopt a final
decision that would be binding on the Member States as well as the EU.746 The
Advocate General took a similar standpoint to that taken by the CJEU as both 
considered the design of the co-respondent mechanism to be problematic. 
However, the Advocate General was of the opinion that appropriate safeguards 
could be put in place to remedy the situation.747
Secondly, the DAA conferred upon the ECtHR the right to allocate responsibility 
in accordance with Article 3(7). This in the eyes of the CJEU would risk adversely 
affecting the division of powers between the EU and its Member States. A further 
problem was also identified by both the CJEU and the Advocate General, as 
Article 3(7) of the DAA does not account for situations in which Member States 
have made a reservation.748 In their view, this could lead to a scenario in which a 
Member State is held responsible despite having made a reservation. Admittedly, 
this would be a rare problem due to the very nature of the procedure, yet the fact 
remains that the DAA is silent as to the effect of reservations on the co­
respondent. It may be argued, as has been done by Tobias Lock, that when the 
DAA is silent, the standard rules of the ECHR would be applied, which would 
mean that the reservation would be given effect.749 However, the CJEU has
clearly required the modification of the procedure envisaged in the DAA. 
6.2 The Procedure for the Prior Involvement of the Court of Justice 
The 'Prior Involvement' procedure is a mechanism that was demanded by the 
CJEU itself. Nevertheless, the mechanism as envisaged in the DAA did not survive 
the Court's scrutiny and was considered to be incompatible with the treaties. 
According to the CJEU there are essentially two reasons for this. Firstly, it was 
considered that it was not for the ECtHR to decide whether prior involvement 
should take place but for the competent EU institution. According to the CJEU, 
allowing the ECtHR to decide whether the CJEU has already given a ruling on a 
question of law would be tantamount to conferring to the ECtHR jurisdiction to 
interpret the case law of the CJEU.75° Consequently a procedure that ensures that
in any case pending before the ECtHR, the EU is informed so that the competent 
institution can inquire whether the Court has already given a ruling on the 
745 Court of Justice, Opinion 2/13, para 221. 
746 ibid para 224. 
141 Court of Justice, Opinion 2/13, View of Advocate General Kokott, para 235. 
748 Court of Justice, Opinion 2/13, paras 226-235. 
749 Tobias Lock, 'The future of the European Union's accession to the European Convention on
Human Rights after Opinion 2/13: is it still possible and is it still desirable?' (2015) 
European Constitutional Law Review 239-273. 
1so Court of Justice, Opinion 2/13, para 239. 
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question at issue or whether the prior involvement procedure should be 
initiated, is required. 
Secondly, the CJEU considered that the agreement envisaged excluded the 
possibility of bringing a matter before the CJEU in order for it to rule on a 
question of interpretation of secondary law through the prior involvement 
procedure. This was considered to adversely affect the competences of the EU 
and the powers of the CJEU. 751 
7. The Specific Characteristics of EU Law as Regards Judicial Review in
CFSP Matters
In regards to CFSP, it has already been noted that the CJEU's jurisdiction is 
generally excluded. At the time of writing, the CJEU has only considered within 
the remit of its jurisdiction the monitoring of compliance with Article 40 TEU and 
the reviewing of the legality of certain decisions as provided for by Article 275(2) 
TFEU. The ECtHR on the other hand, would be empowered by the DAA to rule on 
the compatibility with the ECHR of certain acts, actions or omissions performed 
in the context of CFSP. This would lead to a situation whereby exclusive judicial 
review would be given to a non-EU body. This was rejected by the Court and 
considered prejudicial to the EU's framework. 
Nonetheless, it must be questioned whether this discrepancy between the 
jurisdictions of the two courts would de facto violate the autonomy of EU Law. 
Advocate General Kokott also referred to the issue when arguing that accession 
would undoubtedly mean that the EU must respect the fundamental rights 
protection stemming from the ECHR and thus also the requirement of effective 
legal protection in all its spheres of activity, including the CFSP. The Advocate 
General further stated that the principle of autonomy does not preclude the EU 
joining an international judicial mechanism which extends further than that of 
the CJEU.752 Indeed the principle of autonomy has only ever arisen in cases in
which there was reason to fear a conflict between the two Courts and not in a 
case in which the powers of the CJEU were less extensive than those of an 
international court.753 Furthermore, it should be noted that like the Advocate 
General, the Member States, the Council and the European Commission all agreed 
that such discrepancy did not violate the EU's autonomy, albeit for different 
reasons.754
151 ibid paras 242-247. 
752 Court of Justice, Opinion 2/13, View of Advocate General Kokott, paras 189-191. 
753 Jed Odermatt, 'A Giant Step Backwards? Opinion 2/13 on the EU's Accession to the European 
Convention on Human Rights' (2015) Leuven Centre for Global Governance Studies 
<https://ghum.kuleuven.be/ggs/wplSO-odermatt.pdf> accessed 20 September 2015. 
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Through its rejection, the CJEU is essentially demanding that CFSP be excluded 
from the remit of the ECtHR, or that Treaties are amended to provide the CJEU 
with jurisdiction over CFSP acts. The authors consider the first option to be 
unsatisfactory for the proper protection of human rights in an area where it is 
questionable whether the EU can provide effective legal protection. A proposal in 
2013 to introduce this exclusion by way of specific clause or reservation was in 
fact rejected.755 The latter option, as noted by Jed Odermatt, also causes
difficulties due to the sensitive political nature of CFSP and the reluctance of the 
Member States to allow the CJEU to exercise judicial review in that field.756
8. The Reaction to Opinion 2/13
The general reaction to Opinion 2/13 was overwhelmingly negative. Indeed, 
even President Spielmann was critical of the Opinion calling it a 'great 
disappointment' and stated that it is the citizens of EU who will be the principal 
victims.757 Others, in their disapproval, went as far as to claim that the CJEU's
decision was actually a political decision disguised in legal arguments. This 
opinion is shared by many yet the authors of this article do not believe this is the 
correct position. The Court did in fact concede in Opinion 2/13 that it was open 
to subjecting itself and EU law to external review.758
The criticism that surrounds Opinion 2/13 is understandable given the 
importance tied to accession and the fact that the view of Advocate General 
Kokott demonstrated that a different solution was indeed possible. Despite her 
criticism of certain points, the Advocate General suggested that the Cf EU ought to 
avoid pronouncing the DAA incompatible with the Treaties, but instead hold that 
it was compatible if certain amendments were undertaken following the Court's 
opinion.759 
It may also be questioned if the Court's approach is justifiable in light of Article 6 
of the Treaty of Lisbon which can be read as encompassing a duty of best efforts 
755 Council of Europe, Fourth Negotiation Meeting Between the CDDH ad hoc Negotiation Group 
and the European Commission on the Accession of the European Union to the European 
Convention on Human Rights (2013). 
756 Jed Odermatt, 'A Giant Step Backwards? Opinion 2/13 on the EU's Accession to the European 
Convention on Human Rights' (2015) Leuven Centre for Global Governance Studies 
<https://ghum.kuleuven.be/ggs/wp150-odermatt.pdf> accessed 20 September 2015. 
757 Tobias Lock, 'Will the empire strike back? Strasbourg's reaction to the CJEU's accession 
opinion', (Verfassungs Blog 30 Jan 2015) <http://www.verfassungsblog.de/en/will-empire­
strike-back-strasbourgs-reaction-cjeus-accession-opinion/> accessed 12 October 2015. 
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towards accession.760 The Opinion does indeed present a significant obstacle in 
carrying out the commitment undertaken under the Treaty of Lisbon. 
Nonetheless, it must be noted that although Article 6 provides an obligation to 
accede, this is subject to conditions laid down in Article 6(2) and Protocol No. 8. 
Indeed, the CJEU in Opinion 2/13 did not seem to emphasise its obligation but 
rather that accession is subject to limitations. These limitations essentially 
consider that accession must not affect the EU's competence as defined by the 
Treaties or interfere with the specific characteristics of the EU. 
9. Is the Accession of the EU to the ECHR Still Being Sought?
The EU could not simply ignore the Court's opinion and accede to the ECHR as 
this would be in violation of Article 218(11) TFEU. In accordance with this 
article, the EU had two options if it wished to continue to seek accession: the re­
negotiation of the DAA or changing the founding treaties to accommodate the 
CJEU's views. An extreme version of the latter option was considered by 
Besselink who proposed to draft a 'Notwithstanding Protocol'. According to 
Besselink the following text would be advisable: 
The Union shall accede to the European Convention for the Protection of 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, notwithstanding Article 6(2) 
Treaty on European Union, Protocol (No 8) relating to Article 6(2) of the 
Treaty on European Union and Opinion 2/13 of the Court of Justice of 18 
December 2014.161 
Although this is interesting from an academic perspective, sidelining the CJEU's 
opinion is not the best course of action. Indeed, this would be an extreme 
response and would show disrespect towards the judicial branch. Moreover, not 
all EU Member States would be likely to agree with this measure. 
The EU chose to proceed with what the authors consider to be the most sensible 
option: renegotiating the DAA in order to make it compliant with the 
requirements set out in Opinion 2/13. In Council Meeting 3401 of 23 June 2015, 
the Council reaffirmed its commitment to the accession to the ECHR and invited 
the European Commission as the EU negotiator to bring forward its analysis on 
ways to address Opinion 2/13. Moreover, on the 20 of April 2016 the European 
760 Stefan Reitemeyer and Benedikt Pirker, 'Opinion 2/13 of the Court of Justice on Access of 
the EU to the ECHR - One step ahead and two steps back' (European Law Blog, 31 March 
2015) <http://europeanlawblog.eu/?p=2731> accessed 10 September 2015. 
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<https://WWW.utwente.nl/bms/pa/research/wessel/wessel108.pdf> accessed 20 
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Parliament hosted a meeting with representatives of the institutions to discuss 
the way forward following Opinion 2/13. Juncker has himself held that accession 
is a political priority for the Commission, and that the Commission will not rest 
until a solution is found for the EU's accession to the ECHR. 
However, it may come as a surprise to none that the re-negotiation of a new 
agreement is likely to be a timely and convoluted exercise in political discourse. 
This will in turn give the CJEU a chance to continue building its line of judgments 
based on the Charter and in the long run minimise the direct impact of 
accession.762 
9.1 Would Accession be Beneficial Under the Conditions Imposed by 
the C]EU in Opinion 2/13? 
It is prudent to question whether accession under the Court's terms would be 
beneficial in strengthening the human rights protection in Europe, if the CJEU's 
demands can be met. All this is far from certain, due to the fact that Opinion 2/13 
requires the sacrifice of certain elements that have led to current human rights 
standard, and would have the overall effect of possibly shielding the EU from 
human rights claims being brought against it, most importantly within the CFSP 
and Area of Freedom, Security and Justice. These amendments must be 
questioned and closely scrutinised due to their sensitive political nature and the 
consequent negative impact on human rights protection should they indeed 
come to fruition. From a human rights perspective, excluding CFSP is non­
justifiable as it disallows the ECtHR from remedying potential violations of the 
ECHR. It is for this reason that the authors believe that the Council of Europe 
cannot accept all the amendments proposed by the CJEU in order to properly 
protect the existing safeguards for fundamental human rights. 
The authors of this article consider that the requirement to protect the principle 
of mutual trust is one of the thorniest points raised in Opinion 2/13, due to it 
requiring a far-reaching exclusion of the ECtHR's powers. It must be emphasised 
that there is no effective internal EU mechanism allowing it to compel Member 
States to comply with ECHR standards. Creating the impossibility for the ECtHR 
to hold a Member State of the EU responsible for extraditing a person to another 
Member State where they would be facing a real risk of human rights violations 
would clearly deteriorate the current safeguards set forth in the ECHR. Indeed, 
the amendment would most evidently prevent the ECtHR from interfering in 
762 Adam tazowski and Ramses A. Wessel, The European Court of Justice blocks the EU's 
accession to the ECHR' (2015) 
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Dublin Regulation cases and thus reduce the human rights protection of asylum 
seekers. Furthermore, in its recent revisitation of the Bosphorus doctrine, the 
ECtHR found that the CJEU's stance that review of observance of fundamental 
rights by the state of origin must be limited to exceptional cases was 
unacceptable. The ECtHR held that the domestic court being requested to trust 
the acts of another State must at the very least be empowered to conduct a 
review of any serious allegations of fundamental human rights brought to its 
attention, in order to ensure that the protection of those rights is not manifestly 
deficient. 
10. Conclusion
Irrespective of the stumbling blocks delaying the progression of the EU towards 
ECHR accession, the European Commission has confirmed its commitment to 
accession,763 in the firm belief that it will strengthen fundamental rights 
protection, improve the effectiveness of EU law, and enhance the coherence of 
fundamental rights protection in Europe. 
The legal obligation for the EU to take affirmative steps to conclude an accession 
agreement to comply with the requirements laid down in the Treaties still 
stands. It is however self-evident that the conditions for accession which the 
CJEU laid down in Opinion 2/13 will be both legally and politically challenging to 
meet. The difficulties surrounding accession have also been acknowledged by 
President Spielmann, who has recognised that a possible manner with which to 
alleviate the concerns raised in Opinion 2/13 is by carrying out amendments to 
Treaties of the EU.764 
The CJEU focused its Opinion largely on the EU legal order, without expressly 
acknowledging that the full implications of the accession of a supranational body 
such as the EU alongside individual State parties to the ECHR. In sum, the DAA 
together with the intricate complexities revealed in Opinion 2/13 have together 
shown that the original intention of acceding to the ECHR is very far from 
straightforward. The creation of a single, comprehensive and coherent human 
rights framework has given rise to complex legal problems which can only be 
solved through careful analysis by specialist legal minds, however, the status quo 
is inefficient for the proper protection of fundamental human rights. 
The EU's accession to the ECHR would complete, 
763 European Commission, 2014 Report on the Application of the EU Charter of Fundamental 
Rights, COM(2015) 191 final. 
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a cycle begun at the end of the second world war when human rights 
visionaries, such as French lawyer and Nobel prize winner Rene Cassin, 
drew up the world's first international texts and the Council of Europe 
began its work to establish democracy and the rule of law across the 
continent. 765 
Should the EU accede to the ECHR, it will join a family of 4 7 countries, including 
non-EU members and global powers such as Russia and Turkey, in a system that 
brings them all under the same legal standards, to be monitored by the same 
Court. Furthermore, on a symbolic level, the EU's accession to the ECHR would 
give a strong political signal of coherence between the EU and Europe thereby 
increasing the EU's credibility at a time when it is most needed. This may allow 
the EU to connect with members of population that have criticized its 
competences. 
Despite the arduous power struggle between the different Courts' competences 
and the intricacies tied to the points of contention in the DAA, the CJEU shall 
continue to take ECtHR judgements into account when interpreting 
corresponding Charter provisions, and all EU Member States are bound at 
international law to continue to adhere to the provisions of the ECHR and the 
jurisprudence of its Court, in the same manner as they did before the delivery of 
Opinion 2/13. 
The current geo-political context of an increasingly divided Europe also plays a 
significant role in this power struggle, particularly in the light of the unfortunate 
outcome which the non-accession of the EU could have on the human rights 
perceptions across the different Member States.766 Due to the fact that at present 
it is widely agreed that the Council of Europe remains the yardstick for human 
rights,767 it would be in the EU's interest as much as it is in the interest of the
ECtHR and of victims of human rights breaches to accord the Strasbourg Courts 
with the competence to look into matters of EU law and its institutions' 
competences. 
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